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Abstract.
In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental pol-
icymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open
economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a
candidate whose environmental preferences di®er from their own. Further, the strategic voting incentives
are crucially depend on the environmental policy tools employed by the government, the international
market structures, and the degree of product di®erentiation among ¯rms.
Key words: strategic voting, the race to the bottom, market structure, environmental policy
JEL classi¯cations: F18; D72; D43
1. Introduction
In recent years, the international aspect of environmental policy has been a signi¯cant factor
¤E-mail address: hattori@osaka-ue.ac.jp
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in international and national politics. As for the international aspects, the Kyoto Protocol on
combating global warming is an archetypal example. Another example is that the negotiations
on trade and environmental issues are becoming more prominent in policy discussions constitut-
ing a larger part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). With regard to domestic politics,
environmental issues often occupy an important position in several policy pledges and elections.1
Some citizens are interested not only in the national but also the global environment, and expect
elected politicians to demonstrate the country's initiative in making environmental policies on
international environmental problems.
It is well known that there are considerable strategic relationships among countries for pol-
icymaking with regard to global environmental problems. In this context, previous theoretical
studies have shown that, taking international trade and transboundary pollution into account,
governments may have the following two types of incentives to impose ine®ectively less strin-
gent environmental regulations: ecological-dumping and free-riding incentives.2 The former rep-
resents government incentives to relax domestic environmental regulations for the purpose of
shifting pro¯ts from foreign to domestic ¯rms, and the latter represents them for the purpose of
free-riding on a foreign country's e®orts to reduce transboundary pollution. Thus, the noncooper-
ative behavior of governments may conceptually lead to a \race to the bottom" in environmental
policymaking.
If voters in democratic countries can perceive the above intergovernmental interdependencies
and can anticipate how their choice of a policymaker in°uences the foreign country's policy,
then, in some elections, they might strategically elect policymakers who institute environmen-
tal policies. This strategic voting of democratic people may change the strategic relationships
among governments and hence the behavior of governments. In the context of the relationship
between political systems and environmental policies, for example, Congleton (1992) empirically
shows that authoritarian regimes will adopt less stringent domestic environmental standards than
democratic regimes. Furthermore, Murdoch and Sandler (1997) present evidence that the ex-
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tent of political and civil freedoms had a positive impact on reductions in CFC emissions in the
late 1980s. These results provide evidence for the relationship between the democratic political
system and environmental policies set under it.3
What in°uence does the democratic process have on the strategic relationship with regard
to environmental policies among governments? Siqueria (2003) constructs a two-country delega-
tion model where voters in each country elect a policymaker who noncooperatively implements
a consumption tax on the emission generating goods at a later stage. In this framework, he
shows that the median-voter will tend to prefer a policymaker who lays less emphasis on envi-
ronmental pollution than he or she does, and overall, the outcome will be inferior to the one
derived in the absence of delegation (or election). Subsequently, Buchholz et al. (2005) construct
a model where each government that is democratically elected by its citizens decides its outputs
of environmentally-harmful products cooperatively or noncooperatively, and compare the out-
come under a cooperative policy (an international environmental agreement) with that under a
noncooperative policy. They also show that voters strategically choose their policymaker who is
less eco-friendly than the voters themselves in both cases. In other words, the strategic voting
intensi¯es the free-riding incentives of governments and hence worsens the situation. Further-
more and surprisingly, they show that the the elected politicians can be greener, pollution can
be lower, and the median-voter's payo® can be higher in the case where policies are noncoop-
eratively decided by each government than in the case of international policy cooperation with
bargaining. However, since the above literature focuses on the strategic interaction between gov-
ernments, their investigation does not consider the strategic behavior of ¯rms in an international
market. Given that the strategic interaction of ¯rms may a®ect the above pessimistic results,
the democratic political system might worsen the situation.
Recently, Roelfsema (2007) investigated the citizen's incentives for strategic voting in a model
with strategic relationships both among governments and among ¯rms.4 Taking the ¯rms'
strategic interaction into consideration, governments conceptually have incentives of \ecological-
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dumping" and \free-riding," which leads to a race to the bottom in environmental policymaking,
as mentioned above. However, the race to the bottom arguments have little empirical support.5
Roelfsema (2007) has suggested that the strategic behavior of voters might be a possible expla-
nation for the discrepancy between theory and evidence regarding the race to the bottom. He
constructed a two-country model where citizens in each country strategically elect a politician
who sets and imposes an emission tax on its domestic ¯rms, and showed that citizens may have
an incentive to elect a policymaker who is more concerned about the environment than they
are. Contrary to the results of Buchholz et al. (2005), strategic voting may mitigate the race to
the bottom in the noncooperative environmental tax setting. However, Roelfsema's analysis only
considers the case where ¯rms produce and sell homogenous goods µa la Cournot and policymakers
implement an emission tax as a means of regulation. Thus, the e®ects of product di®erentia-
tions, alternative market structures, and other policy instruments on the strategic voting remain
unresolved.
In this paper, a three-stage game involving ¯rms, elected policymakers, and voters in two
countries is developed to address the issue. In particular, the citizens in each country elect a
policymaker by means of majority rule in stage 1. In stage 2, the elected policymaker in each
country noncooperatively decides on domestic environmental policies (either taxes or standards).
In stage 3, given the domestic environmental regulations, the representative ¯rm in each country
produces and sells the di®erentiated goods in a world market a la Cournot or Bertrand. The
investigations in this paper di®er from the above mentioned previous works in the following
aspects. First, by incorporating the notion of product di®erentiation into Roelfsema's political-
economy model, our framework covers all degree of product di®erentiations between domestic and
foreign products. This enables us to examine the relationship between the market competitiveness
and the voters' incentives for strategic voting. Second, we consider both the emission tax (price
regulation) and the emission standard (quantity regulation) as the elected policymakers' policy
tools. Third, this paper also considers alternative market structures, that is, Bertrand as well as
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Cournot.
As a result of the investigations, we ¯nd that the outcome of strategic voting crucially de-
pends on the policy instruments, market structures, and degree of product di®erentiations. In
particular, we obtain the following results. First, under Cournot competition, citizens in each
country deliberately vote for a more (or less) green candidate who employs an emission tax policy
as an environmental regulation. Electing a policymaker who has higher (or lower) environmental
awareness credibly commits the country to setting a higher (or lower) tax rate, and hence, it af-
fects the foreign tax policy. Taking these factors into account, citizens may strategically vote for
a candidate whose environmental preferences di®er from their own. In particular, the higher the
degree of market competition and environmental externalities, the more likely it is that citizens
deliberately choose a tax-setting policymaker who is greener than themselves. In such a case,
welfare in each country is improved by the voters' strategic behavior. On the other hand, citizens
would de¯nitely vote for a candidate who is less green than themselves when the elected poli-
cymakers in both countries employ an emission standard (command-and-control) policy. Such
strategic voting incentives reduce welfare in both the countries. Therefore, taking the strategic
behavior of voters into consideration, we suggest that a tax (incentive-based) policy is preferable
to a standard (command-and-control) policy with respect to global welfare and the environment.
Second, voters necessarily elect a tax-setting policymaker who is greener than themselves under
Bertrand competition. Finally, if the domestic and foreign products are perfectly di®erentiated,
then citizens in each country vote sincerely for a candidate, regardless of the policy tools that
the policymakers employ and the market structure that the ¯rms compete in. This is because
the voters' choice of a policymaker is no longer strategic in character.
The remainder of the paper comprises three sections. Section 2 presents the basic model
with a Cournot market structure, and then analyzes the voters' incentives to deliberately elect a
policymaker who implements an emission tax and standard policies, respectively, in a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the game. Section 3 analyzes the same in the model with a Bertrand
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market structure, and concluding remarks are drawn in Section 4.
2. The Model
Consider two democratic countries labeled by i (i = 1; 2). In each country, there is one repre-
sentative ¯rm. Emitting transboundary pollution, each ¯rm i (i = 1; 2) produces di®erentiated
products and sells them in the world market µa la Cournot. The model has three stages. In
stage 1, via an election under majority rule, the citizens in each country elect a policymaker
who then sets the domestic environmental policy in stage 2. In stage 3, ¯rms engage in Cournot
competition with product di®erentiation in the world market.
We consider the following two types of environmental policies: emission taxes and standards.
First, we investigate the strategic incentives of voters to elect policymakers in the case where
each elected policymaker (or government) uses emission taxes as a means of regulating domestic
emissions. Second, we investigate them in the case where each government employs emission
standards.
2.1. STRATEGIC VOTING FOR A TAX-SETTING GOVERNMENT
Assuming the inverse demand of the world market as Pi(q1; q2; µ); where Pi represents the
price of the products of ¯rm i; qi, the outputs of ¯rm i; and µ 2 (0; 1], the degree of product
di®erentiation. Here, we assume the following:
@Pi
@qi
´ P 0i < 0;
@Pi
@qj
= µP 0i ;
@2Pi
@q2i
=
@2Pi
@qi@qj
= 0 8i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j:6
Larger (smaller) µ impliess that the products are lowly (highly) di®erentiated. The products
are homogenous when µ = 1, which corresponds to the investigation of Roelfsema (2007), and
become independent when µ converges to zero.
The model is solved backwards from the last game to the ¯rst. In stage 3, each ¯rm simulta-
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neously chooses its output, taking as given both the rival's output and the emission tax set by
the government. Pro¯ts of ¯rm i are given by ¼i = Piqi ¡ eitiqi, where ei is the emissions per
unit of output and ti is the rate of emission tax or subsidy in country i.7 The ¯rst- and second-
order conditions for maximizing pro¯ts of ¯rm i are Pi + P 0iqi = eiti and ¡2P 0i < 0, respectively.
Performing comparative statics on the ¯rst-order conditions for both ¯rms and arranging them,
we obtain
@qi
@ti
=
2ei
(4¡ µ2)P 0i
< 0;
@qj
@ti
= ¡ µei
(4¡ µ2)P 0i
= ¡µ
2
@qi
@ti
> 0;
which show that the variables qi and qj are strategic substitutes since @qj=@qi = ¡µ=2 · 0.
We now investigate the stage 2 equilibrium where the elected policymaker in each country
simultaneously and noncooperatively sets the domestic emission tax rate. We assume that the
pro¯ts of the domestic ¯rm are equally distributed among country i's inhabitants. We also assume
that the policymaker ignores the e®ect of government policy on domestic consumers since the
domestic consumption is su±ciently small in comparison to the world consumption. Thus, the
policymaker's utility in country i is given by V pi = ¼
n
i ¡ ¸piEi; where ¼ni is the before tax pro¯ts
of ¯rm i, ¸pi is the environmental preference (or awareness) of the policymaker elected in country
i, and Ei = Di(eiqi) + ·Dj(ejqj) is the environmental damages from the pollution of country
i. The function Di(¢) is the environmental damage function of country i and has the following
properties:
dD(¢)
d(eiqi)
´ D0i > 0;
d2D(¢)
d(eiqi)2
´ D00i ¸ 0 8i = f1; 2g;
and D00i is a positive constant. The parameter · 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of pollution
spillovers from emissions in the other country. · = 1 (· = 0) implies that the pollution is global
(perfectly local).
The ¯rst- and second-order conditions for maximizing utilities by the policymaker in country
7
i are as follows:
@V pi
@ti
=
@qi
@ti
"µ
1¡ µ
2
2
¶
P 0iqi + Pi ¡ ¸pi
µ
eiD
0
i ¡
·µ
2
ejD
0
j
¶#
= 0 (1a)
@2V pi
@t2i
=
µ
@qi
@ti
¶2"
(2¡ µ2)P 0i ¡ ¸pi
µ
e2iD
00
i +
·µ2
4
e2jD
00
j
¶#
< 0: (1b)
Using the ¯rst-order condition for maximizing the pro¯ts of ¯rms, we can rewrite (1a) as
ti = ¸
p
iD
0
i ¡
µ
2ei
³
¸pi·ejD
0
j ¡ µP 0iqi
´
: (2)
The above equation implies that ti = ¸
p
iD
0
i holds when µ converges to zero. In other words, the
optimal (second-best) environmental tax levied on the domestic ¯rm, which is a monopolist in
the world market, coincides with the domestic Pigouvian tax rate (i.e. the domestic marginal
environmental damage). Further, it is obtained independently from the foreign tax strategy, even
if there are negative pollution spillovers. The result of µ = 0 here is consistent with the results
of Rauscher (1997).8
Furthermore, (2) implies that the policymaker strategically sets ti so that it is lower than
¸piDi, and the di®erences are increasing in µ and ·. These properties are considered as the
well-known ecological-dumping and free-riding incentives of the environmental policymakers, as
mentioned in the introduction.
Totally di®erentiating the ¯rst-order conditions of both policymakers (1a) and imposing sym-
metry in equilibrium9 yields the following:
@ti
@¸pi
=
1
¢
·
@2V pi
@t2i| {z }
¡
@qi
@ti|{z}
¡
µ
1¡ µ·
2
¶
eD0
¸
> 0 (3a)
@tj
@¸pi
= ¡ 1
¢
·
@2V pi
@ti@tj
@qi
@ti|{z}
¡
µ
1¡ µ·
2
¶
eD0
¸
? 0 , @
2V pi
@ti@tj
? 0 (3b)
where the determinant ¢ = (@2V pi =@t
2
i )
2 ¡ (@2V pi =@ti@tj)2 > 0 by assumption.
From (3a), we can observe that the stronger preferences for the environment of the policymaker
in country i raise ti, while the e®ect of changes in ¸
p
i on tj depends on the sign of
@2V pi
@ti@tj
, which
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represents the e®ect of the marginal increase in the foreign tax on the marginal bene¯t of the
domestic tax. Moreover, the sign of @
2V pi
@ti@tj
represents the strategic relationship between the tax
choices. Indeed, ti and tj are strategic substitutes when
@2V pi
@ti@tj
< 0. In this case, the foreign tax
rates are reduced when the domestic government becomes greener. On the other hand, when
ti and tj are strategic complements (
@2V pi
@ti@tj
> 0), the foreign tax rates are increased when the
domestic government becomes greener, since the foreign policymaker follows a tax increase in
the domestic country.
It follows that
@2V pi
@ti@tj
= ¡ @qi
@ti|{z}
¡
@qi
@tj|{z}
+
"
¡ µ
2
2
jP 0j+ ¸pe2(1 + ·)D00
#
; (4)
which implies that whether the tax choices are strategic substitutes or complements depends on
the values of ¸p, µ, jp0j, e, ·, and D00. The above equation also implies that if µ converges to zero,
the strategic relationship between ti and tj disappears (i.e. (4) = 0) since limµ=0 @qi=@tj = 0.
The ¯rst term in the parentheses, ¡µ2 jP 0j=2, represents the e®ect of the marginal increase in
the foreign tax on the marginal pro¯ts of the domestic tax, that is, @2¼ni =@ti@tj . Since the term is
negative, this captures the policymakers' incentive for lowering tax rates in reaction to an increase
in the foreign tax rate. We also ¯nd that the incentive is larger when the products are more
homogenous (large µ) and the price elasticity of demand is less elastic (large jP 0j). The second
term in the parentheses, ¸pe2(1+·)D00, represents the e®ect of the marginal increase in the foreign
tax on the marginal environmental bene¯ts of the domestic tax, that is, @2(¡¸piEi)=@ti@tj . Since
the term is positive, this captures the policymakers' incentive for raising tax rates in reaction to
an increase in the foreign tax rate. This originates from the fact that an increase in foreign tax
reduces foreign outputs and raises the domestic outputs and hence the emissions. The incentive
is larger when the policymakers are greener (large ¸p) and the environmental damages are more
serious (large e, ·, and D00). Thus, we obtain the following lemma.
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Lemma 1
The tax choices of each policymaker are strategic complements (substitutes) if the following
condition holds:
µ2
¯¯
P 0
¯¯
2 e2 (1 + ·)¸pD00
< (>) 1: (5)
The tax choices are more likely to exhibit strategic complements when (i) the products are more
di®erentiated, (ii) the demands are more elastic, (iii) the emission coe±cients are larger, (iv)
the degree of pollution spillovers is larger, and (v) the convexity of the environmental damage
function is stronger.
Proof: The lemma is directly obtained by equation (4). ¥
We ¯nally investigate the stage 1 equilibrium where citizens in each country elect the poli-
cymaker by majority voting. The derivations of the equilibrium are based on Besley and Coate
(2003) and Roelfsema (2007). We assume that the utility of citizens in country i only di®ers in
terms of their environmental preferences ¸i. Thus, the median-voter theorem can be applied if
the citizens' utility is strictly concave in ¸pi . When selecting a candidate, the median-voters take
into account the e®ects of their choices on the tax rate in the foreign country that is described
by (3b). Thus, the median-voters may not select the candidate who has the same environmental
preferences for strategic reasons.
The preference of the median-voter i who lives in country i is given by V mi = ¼
n
i ¡ ¸mi Ei;
where ¸mi is the median-voter i's preferences for the environment. The median-voter i chooses the
policymaker's preference for the environment, ¸pi , so as to maximize his/her own utilities. Taking
(1a) and symmetric equilibrium into account, after rearrangement, the ¯rst-order condition that
describes the preferences of the optimal candidate is as follows:
@V mi
@¸pi
=
@ti
@¸pi|{z}
+
@qi
@ti|{z}
¡
·³
¸p ¡ ¸m
´µ
1¡ µ·
2
¶
eD0
¸
+
@tj
@¸pi|{z}
+ or ¡
@V mi
@tj| {z }
+
= 0: (6)
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In the above equation, following Roelfsema (2007), we assume @V mi =@tj > 0, which implies that
the median-voter is not an extreme environmentalist who wants the other country to lower its
tax rate in order to shrink the output of his/her own country.10 Combining (3b), (5), and (6),
we obtain
¸p ? ¸m , @tj
@¸pi
? 0 , @
2V pi
@ti@tj
? 0 , µ
2
¯¯
P 0
¯¯
2 e2 (1 + ·)¸pD00
7 1: (7)
This shows that the voters have incentives to deliberately support greener candidates than the
themselves (i.e., ¸p > ¸m) when the tax choices are strategic complements. Thus, we obtain the
following proposition and corollary.
Proposition 1
Voters strategically elect tax-setting policymakers who are more (less) green than themselves if
the tax choices of governments are strategic complements (substitutes).
The economic intuitions behind the proposition are as follows. From (3b), we ¯nd that
if the tax choices of policymakers are strategic complements, then the domestic citizens can
raise the foreign tax as well as the domestic tax by electing a greener policymaker. Since the
noncooperative rate of emission tax is suboptimally low due to the ecological-dumping and free-
riding incentives in our setting, increases in the tax rates of both the countries are bene¯cial for
the welfare of both countries. On the other hand, if the tax choices of policymakers are strategic
substitutes, then the citizens can raise the foreign tax rate by electing a domestic policymaker
who has lower ¸. Thus, in this case, voters in both countries strategically choose a less green
government in order to free-ride the foreign tax contributions and heighten the strategic position
of domestic ¯rms.
By considering the result of Lemma 1, we ¯nd that citizens are more likely to choose a gov-
ernment greener than themselves when (i) the products are more di®erentiated, (ii) the demands
are more elastic, (iii) the emission coe±cients are larger, (iv) the degree of pollution spillovers is
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larger, and (v) the convexity of the environmental damage function is stronger. Intuitively, vot-
ers tend to delegate to environment \lovers" when the market is more competitive ((i) and (ii))
and/or the environmental externalities are stronger ((iii), (iv), and (v)). The results generalize
and correct the results of Roelfsema (2007).11
In addition, since limµ=0(@tj=@¸
p
i ) = 0, we ¯nd that citizens choose a politician who has
the same preference for the environment that they do when µ is close to zero. In other words,
voters sincerely vote for the politician when the domestic and foreign products are perfectly
di®erentiated.
2.2. STRATEGIC VOTING FOR A STANDARD-SETTING GOVERNMENT
In this subsection, we investigate the strategic incentives for voters in the case where policymakers
in both countries employ emission standards as a policy tool. The emission standards are de¯ned
as direct regulations on the total allowable volume of emissions, i.e., eiqi by policymaker i. Since
our model includes neither emission abatement activities nor environmental R&D by ¯rms, we
de¯ne the emission standard (ceiling) as the policy by which the policymakers directly choose
the amount (or upper bound) of the domestic outputs denoted by ¹qi. Thus, the policy can be
also considered as a command-and-control instrument.
Given that the utilities of the policymaker in country i are V pi = ¼
n
i ¡ ¸piEi, the ¯rst- and
second-order conditions for maximizing utilities of country i's policymaker are
@V pi
@¹qi
= P 0i ¹qi + Pi ¡ ¸pi eiD0i = 0; (8a)
@2V pi
@¹q2i
= 2P 0i ¡ ¸pi e2i D00i < 0; (8b)
where (8a) implies that the policymaker chooses the output (emission) ceiling so as to equate the
marginal revenues of production with the marginal domestic environmental damages evaluated
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by him.12 Totally di®erentiating the ¯rst-order conditions yields
@¹qi
@¸pi
=
1
£
h
(2P 0i ¡ ¸pi e2i D00i )eiD0i
i
< 0 (9a)
@¹qj
@¸pi
= ¡ 1
£
(µ P 0i eiD
00
i ) > 0; (9b)
where the determinant £ > 0.13 Equations (9a) and (9b) imply that the stronger environmen-
tal preferences of the domestic policymaker tighten domestic emission control but relax foreign
emission control. Notice also that (9b) becomes zero when µ converges to zero.
Next, we derive an equilibrium where median-voters in each country simultaneously elect their
policymaker. Using (8a), we obtain the ¯rst-order condition that describes the preferences of the
optimal candidates:
@V mi
@¸pi
=
@¹qi
@¸pi|{z}
¡
·¡
¸p ¡ ¸m¢ eD0¸+ @¹qj
@¸pi|{z}
+
@V mi
@¹qj| {z }
¡
= 0: (10)
Since @V mi =@¹qj = µP
0
i ¹qi ¡ ¸mi ·ejD0j < 0, we ¯nd that ¸p < ¸m necessarily holds.
Proposition 2
Voters strategically elect standard-setting policymakers who are less green than themselves.
In contrast to the previous case where policymakers employ an emission tax policy, median-
voters in each country necessarily elect policymakers who are less green than themselves when
each elected policymaker employs emission standard policies. Intuitively, electing a policymaker
who has low preferences for the environment serves as a commitment to a lax environmental
regulation. Since the foreign policymaker observes the commitment before he implements the
standard policy, the commitment tightens the regulation in the foreign country and is bene¯cial
for its own welfare. Thus, in the symmetric equilibrium, both voters deliberately choose a less
green policymaker.
The proposition is closely related to the result of \isolatinist" scenario in Buchholz et al.
(2005). In the scenario where governments noncooperatively determine their output of domestic
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products, they show that strategic voting results in a government that assigns less weight to the
environment than the median voter. Our Proposition 2 also shows that a quantity-regulating
policy leads to the same outcome even when there are strategic interactions among ¯rms in a
product market.
In addition, from (9b) and (10), it follows that ¸p = ¸m if µ converges to zero. Combining the
result obtained in the previous subsection, we ¯nd that citizens sincerely vote for a candidate
who has the same preference for the environment as the voters themselves when the domestic and
foreign products are perfectly di®erentiated, regardless of the policy instruments employed by
the policymakers and the degree of transboundary pollution. It is interesting to compare these
results with those of Siqueria (2003). He showed that the median-voter will choose a policymaker
who places the same amount of weight on an externality as he/she does only if the externality
is unidirectional (that is, not reciprocal). In contrast, our results indicate that if the domestic
and foreign products are perfectly di®erentiated, such a \sincere voting" result may arise even
if the externality is reciprocal in nature. Although these results appear to be con°icting, their
rationales are exactly similar: The strategic interaction between policymakers disappears due
to the unidirectional externality in Siqueria's model, whereas it disappears due to the perfect
di®erentiation of products in our model.
3. Under Price Competition
In this supplementary section, we consider the case where ¯rms compete in their prices in the
international product market, and investigate the strategic incentives of median-voters for electing
tax-setting policymakers.14
Assume the world market demand as Qi(pi; pj ;Á), where Qi is the quantity demanded, pi is
the price of good i, and Á 2 (0:1] is the degree of product di®erentiation. Here, we assume the
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following:
@Qi
@pi
´ Q0i < 0;
@Qi
@pj
= ¡ÁQ0i > 0;
@2Qi
@p2i
=
@2Qi
@pi@pj
= 0 8i 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j:
Larger (smaller) Á implies that the products are lowly (highly) di®erentiated.15
We ¯rst derive the equilibrium in stage 3. Given the pro¯ts of ¯rm i by ¼i = Qi(pi; pj ;Á)[pi¡
eiti], the ¯rst-order condition for maximizing the pro¯ts of ¯rm i is obtained as Q0i[pi¡eiti]+Qi =
0 8i 2 f1; 2g. Total di®erentiation of the ¯rst-order conditions yields the following:
@pi
@ti
=
2ei
4¡ Á2 > 0;
@pj
@ti
=
Áei
4¡ Á2 =
Á
2
@pi
@ti
> 0:
These comparative static results also imply that the price choices by ¯rms are strategic comple-
ments (i.e., dpi=dpj > 0), which is di®erent from the case of the Cournot competition.
In stage 2, each policymaker i simultaneously and noncooperatively chooses the domestic
rate of emission taxes so as to maximize V pi = ¼
n
i ¡ ¸piEi, where Ei = D
¡
eiQi(pi; pj ;Á)
¢
+
·D
¡
ejQj(pi; pj ;Á)
¢
. The ¯rst- and second-order conditions are
@V pi
@ti
=
@pi
@ti
·µ
1¡ Á
2
2
¶
Q0i pi +Qi ¡ ¸pi
µ³
1¡ Á
2
2
´
eiQ
0
iD
0
i ¡
Á·
2
ejQ
0
j D
0
j
¶¸
= 0; (11)
@2V pi
@t2i
=
µ
@pi
@ti
¶2·
(2¡ Á2)Q0i ¡ ¸pi
µ³
1¡ Á
2
2
´2
e2i (Q
0
i)
2D0i +
Á2·
4
e2j (Q
0
j)
2D0j
¶¸
< 0:
Obviously, ti = ¸
p
iD
0
i holds when Á converges to 0, which implies that the second-best tax rates
that the price-setting ¯rm faces are equal to the domestic marginal environmental damage when
the domestic and foreign products are perfectly di®erentiated.
By totally di®erentiating (11) and imposing symmetry in equilibrium, we obtain the following
comparative static results for i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j.
@ti
@¸pi
=
1
­
·
@2V pi
@t2i
µ
1¡ Á
2
(Á+ ·)
¶
eQ0D0
¸
> 0; (12a)
@tj
@¸pi
= ¡ 1
­
·
@2V pi
@ti@tj
µ
1¡ Á
2
(Á+ ·)
¶
eQ0D0
¸
> 0; (12b)
where the determinant ­ ´ (@2V pi =@t2i )2 ¡ (@2V pi =@ti@tj)2 > 0 by assumption, and
@2V pi
@ti@tj
=
@pi
@ti
@pi
@tj
·
¡ Á
2
2
Q0 + ¸p
µ
1¡ Á
2
2
¶
e2(Q0)2D00
¡
1 + ·
¢¸
> 0: (13)
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Condition (12a) captures the positive impacts of ¸pi on ti. This implies that the greener poli-
cymaker sets a higher rate of domestic tax. Condition (12b) captures the impacts of ¸pi on tj .
Unlike the case with Cournot competition, the stronger preferences of policymaker i for the en-
vironment also raise the foreign tax rates because the policy choices are strategic complements,
as shown by (13). In other words, electing a candidate who has a higher ¸p induces a higher rate
of emission taxes in the home and foreign countries.16
We ¯nally derive an equilibrium in stage 1 where the voters in each country simultaneously
elect a policymaker so as to maximize their utilities: V mi = ¼
n
i ¡¸mi Ei. The ¯rst-order condition
for choosing ¸pi of a median-voter living in country i is
@V mi
@¸pi
=
@ti
@¸pi
@pi
@ti| {z }
+
·¡
¸p ¡ ¸m¢µ1¡ Á
2
(Á+ ·)
¶
eQ0D0| {z }
¡
¸
+
@tj
@¸pi|{z}
+
@V mi
@tj| {z }
+
= 0: (14)
Given that @V mi =@tj > 0;
17 we ¯nd that ¸p > ¸m holds necessarily, which implies that the
citizens vote for a candidate who is more concerned about the environment than they are.
Proposition 3
Under the Bertrand structure of the international market, voters strategically elect tax-setting
policymakers who are more green than themselves.
Unlike the previous case with Cournot competition, voters necessarily choose a candidate
who has stronger preferences for the environment than themselves under Bertrand market struc-
tures. The reason is that citizens can earn higher industry pro¯ts and lower environmental
damages if they can commit to setting a higher rate of emission tax because the commitment
can raise tj and hence pj as well as pi. This is because the prices and taxes are both strategic
complements.18 Thus, in the symmetric equilibrium, voters in both countries elect a greener
policymaker. Furthermore, we ¯nd that under Bertrand competition, the perfect di®erentiation
between the domestic and foreign products leads to sincere voting in both countries because
@tj=@¸
p
i = 0 when Á converges to zero.
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4. Concluding Remarks
Environmental policies, as well as all other policy decisions, are products of political processes. If
voters consider strategic interdependencies among governments in international trade-environment
arguments, they may strategically choose a politician who implements domestic environmental
policies. In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative
environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environ-
mental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have
an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental preferences di®er from
their own. Further, the strategic voting incentives are closely related to the environmental policy
tools employed by the government and the international market structures.
Under the situation where each country's ¯rms engage in Cournot competition in the world
market, citizens in each country strategically elect a tax-setting policymaker who is more (or less)
green than themselves. In particular, they are more likely to choose a greener government than
themselves when competition among ¯rms and/or environmental externalities are more severe.
Since the noncooperative rate of emission tax is ine±ciently low, such strategic voting in both
countries enhances welfare of both countries. In addition, if ¯rms compete in prices (Bertrand)
rather than quantities (Cournot), voters have an incentive to elect a tax-setting policymaker who
is greener than themselves. On the other hand, they elect a standard-setting policymaker who
is less green than themselves. Since the second-best emission standards (ceilings) are strategic
substitutes, citizens elect a less green candidate and commit to lax regulation in order to induce
stringent regulation in the other country. Such strategic voting in both countries reduces their
welfare because the level of emission control noncooperatively set by each policymaker is inef-
¯ciently low. Thus, from the viewpoint of strategic voting, emission tax may induce a higher
welfare gain than an emission standard. This may con¯rm the advantage of \incentive-basede"
instruments over \command-and-control" instruments in international relations.19 Finally, in
any case, sincere voting arises in each country if products are perfectly di®erentiated, regardless
17
of the degree of environmental externalities.
Our analysis can be extended in several important ways. One conceivable extension of our
analysis is to allow for asymmetricity between the policies employed by each policymaker. Dif-
ferences in the policies adopted across countries can change the strategic relationship between
policymakers and hence a®ect citizens' incentives for strategic voting. Another extension would
be to incorporate the voters' choice of policy instruments into our model. In this paper, we
assume that voters can only choose a type of policymaker, taking the type of policy instruments
employed by the elected policymaker as given.20 The endogenous choice of policy instruments
through political processes may elucidate the relationship between voters' preferences for the
environment and those for policy instruments. These matters await future investigation.
Acknowledgments
Notes
1 For example, in several northern European nations, green interest groups have organized their own
political parties and have become part of a governing majority.
2 For further details on international trade and strategic environmental policy, see, for example, Ulph
(1992, 1996), Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994), Conrad (1996), and Rauscher (1997, 2005), among
many others.
3 For a review and assessment of the extensive literature on the political determination of environmen-
tal regulation, see Oates and Portney (2003). Furthermore, using the modern tools of economics and
public choice, Congleton (1996) examines the political and economic factors that generate environ-
mental policy.
4 See Frederikson (1997, 1999), Rauscher (1997), Ulph (1998), and Schleich (1999) for alternative
political-economy models relating to trade-environmet arguments.
18
5 With regard to this point, see List and Gerking (2000), World Bank (2000), Antweiler and Copeland
(2001), Fredriksson and Millimet (2002), and Millimet (2003), among many others.
6 For example, an inverse demand such as Pi = a¡ b(qi + µqj) has the properties we assume here.
7 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are no production costs.
8 In Rauscher (1997), constructing the model of monopolistic behavior, he showed that the optimal
environmental policy vis-µa-vis a domestic ¯rm, which is a monopolist in the foreign market, is to use
a Pigouvian emission tax (Proposition 6.2 in Rauscher (1997)).
9 Throughout the paper, variables without subscripts denote those in a symmetric equilibrium.
10 In symmetric equilibrium, we obtain
@V mi
@tj
=
1
2
@qj
@tj
h
µ(p0 q ¡ p)¡ ¸meD0(2·¡ µ)
i
:
From the above equation, we con¯rm that a su±cient condition for holding the assumption of
@V mi =@tj > 0 is 2· ¸ µ. Even when 2· < µ, the assumption almost holds unless voters are ex-
treme environmentalists. To see why, consider an extreme case with · = 0 and µ = 1. In this case,
@V mi =@tj < 0 holds only if ¸
meD0 > P ¡P 0 q, that is, the marginal environmental damages that the
median-voter evaluates are much greater than the price of goods.
11 Roelfsema (2007) indicated that both median-voters are more likely to delegate to environmental
lovers when the pollution spillovers · are smaller and the demand is less elastic. These are incorrectly
derived from equation (7) in his paper. For further details on these corrections and intuitions, see
Hattori (2007).
12 Di®erentiating (8a) in ¹qj , we obtain @2V
p
i =@¹qi@¹qj = µ P
0
i < 0. Thus, we ¯nd that ¹qi and ¹qj are
strategic substitutes.
13 In detail, £ =
³
@2V pi
@t2i
´2
¡
³
@2V pi
@ti@tj
´2
= (4¡ µ2)(P 0i )2 + ¸pi e2iD00i (¸pi e2iD00i ¡ 4P 0i ) > 0.
14 In this paper, we do not consider the case where ¯rms compete in their prices and governments use
an emission standard because of the complexities of investigations. However, we can imagine that
the results of such a case are identical to those of the investigations in section 2.2. This is because
emission controls here are considered as a quantity precommitment before Bertrand competition,
which may yield Cournot (emission control) outcomes as shown by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
19
15 For example, a demand function such as Qi = ¹a¡¹b(pi¡Á pj), where ¹a and ¹b are positive constants,
has the same properties that we assume here.
16 Since ­ is positive by assumption, it holds that @ti
@¸pi
>
@tj
@¸pi
, that is, the e®ect of a change in the
policymaker's preferences for the environment on the domestic tax rate should be greater than that
on the foreign tax rate.
17 The assumption implies that the median-voter is not an extreme environmentalist. In particular, we
obtain
@V mi
@tj
=
1
2
@pj
@tj|{z}
+
h
Á(Q¡ pQ0)¡ ¸meD0iQ0
©
·(2¡ Á2)¡ Áªi;
which indicates that a su±cient condition for holding the assumption of @V mi =@tj > 0 is · >
Á
(2¡Á2) .
Even when · < Á(2¡Á2) , the assumption almost holds unless voters are extremely environmentalists
in nature. To check this, consider a case with · = 0 and µ = 1. In that case, @V mi =@tj < 0 holds
only if ¡¸meD0iQ0 > (Q+ pQ0)¡ 2pQ0, that is, the marginal environmental damages brought about
by a decrease in price are much greater than the marginal revenues of price.
18 The result is similar to Barrett's (1994) seminal analysis of environmental standards. He shows that
if ¯rms compete in prices, countries have an incentive to unilaterally impose strong standards.
19 Notice that the advantage of the tax against the standard does not imply that one country should
employ tax regulations, because our analysis only considers the symmetric situation. Our results
simply imply that strategic voting may lead to a better outcome when all countries employ taxes
than when they employ standards.
20 For the question pertaining to the choice of environmental policy instruments in the context of a
model of strategic international trade, see, for example, Ulph (1992, 1996).
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